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1. Global Public Finance
Our global responsibilities, and the pressing need to fund the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs), provide the policy focus for my lecture, as I explain
more fully in the next section. The intellectual focus is summarised by the term
‘global public finance’. One of the two main themes of this lecture is that a new
branch of economics is developing – global public finance – combining different
existing fields. The subject of global public finance will, I hope, increasingly
appear on the curricula of university economics courses. The material will of
course draw on existing branches of economics, but it will be directed at a specific
set of policy issues. The second main theme of the lecture is that global public
finance can contribute to the analysis of key policy issues and provide new
insights.
What are the ingredients of this new subject? The first is clearly national public
finance, a subject that broadened in the 1970s into public economics. But it
remained a largely national subject. I plead guilty here myself. The graduate text
that I wrote with Joe Stiglitz, Lectures on Public Economics, failed to address
international issues. This shortcoming was perhaps less apparent in 1980 when
the book was published, but today a course in public finance should, I believe,
begin from page 1 with an open economy, where the impact of taxes and
government spending are considered in a context of international competition and
factor movements. The incidence of a tax on income from work depends in part
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on the extent of labour mobility across borders, and this is even more the case for
taxes on capital income and taxes on corporations. This has far-reaching
implications. It means too that the economic models employed have to allow for
the movement of goods, capital and people. We have to consider behavioural
reactions in terms of not just how hard to work, or how much to save, but where
to work and where to hold one’s savings. 
Analysis of the geography of economic activity is the centrepiece of a second old-
established field of economics: international economics. Public finance
economists need to borrow from their analytical armoury. In this we are helped by
the fact that the general equilibrium tradition of international trade theory is one
that fits naturally with public economics, and that the long-standing policy issues,
such as the transfer problem (to which I return below), have much in common. But
international economics too has to borrow from other fields, a prime example
being the economics of growth and development.
However, we do not just need to extend our analytical model to an open economy.
We have also to take account of the divided political structure. Whereas for the
purposes of national public finance it may be sufficient to posit a single political
authority, in a global context we have to recognise the existence of diverse
political entities with differing, possibly conflicting, objectives. (The same of
course applies in research on federal or local governments.) This means that we
cannot escape studying political economy, or how governments make fiscal and
other decisions. The fact that the impact of a tax on earnings in the Netherlands
depends on decisions as to whether to work here or in Belgium means that we
have to consider the determination of the tax rates in Belgium. It is possible that
Belgian tax policy is uninfluenced by the tax rates set in The Hague, but they are
likely in practice to be interdependent. It is seldom made explicit, but in an
interdependent world, the positive analysis of tax incidence requires an input of
political economy.
The global setting means, finally, that the basis for normative public finance has
to be reconsidered. The standard approach to evaluating different fiscal policies
assumes that the interests of all citizens enter that evaluation symmetrically. In a
modern democracy, all count equally, and if you and I are in all relevant respects
identical (we have for example the same number of children), then interchanging
our economic circumstances should not change the social valuation. But does this
carry over to a global situation? On one view, that of global cosmopolitanism, the
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answer is ‘yes’: all world citizens enter symmetrically in to the social welfare
function. This is an attractive view, but not one that is universally, or even widely,
held. Indeed more widely held is the opposite extreme where the evaluation of
policy considers purely the national interest. In between are those who, for
various reasons, including a view about agency, give weight to the citizens of
other countries but less than to those of their own country. Their social welfare
functions have a global reach but the country in which people live is part of the
context with which we evaluate different policies. 
The construction of a global public finance can therefore draw on many existing
ingredients, and critics may say that it is simply ‘re-packaging’. This may be true,
but I want to argue tonight that it can help illuminate a key global issue: the
funding of development goals. This too is not a new subject. The Netherlands has
long been in the forefront of seeking to achieve progress on development. Its
record on Official Development Assistance (ODA) is very impressive; in 2004 this
represented 0.74% of Gross National Income, compared with 0.36% in the UK and
0.16% in the US. Along with Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway and Sweden, the
Netherlands is the only country to reach the UN target for ODA. Nor is there much
novelty about the alternatives to ODA that I shall be discussing. The idea of a
‘Tobin tax’ (see below) on foreign currency transactions was first proposed a third
of a century ago. But I would like to show how we can obtain new insights and
some new ideas about ways forward by bringing to bear the accumulated
knowledge which provides the ingredients for the field of global public finance.
2. Millennium Development Goals: the Challenge
At the Millennium Summit in September 2000, the states of the United Nations set
out a vision of a global partnership for development, directed at the achievement
of specific targets. Specifically, 189 countries signed up to the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) summarized in Box 1 (page 19). The concrete goals
include the halving by 2015 of the proportion of people living in extreme poverty,
halving the proportion hungry, and halving the proportion lacking access to safe
drinking water. The objectives include the achievement of universal primary
education and gender equality in education, the achievement by 2015 of a three-
fourths decline in maternal mortality and a two-thirds decline in mortality among
children under five. They include halting and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS and
providing special assistance to AIDS orphans.
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Since the declaration of the MDGs, a number of attempts have been made to
estimate the financing requirements. At a global level, the Report of the Panel
chaired by President Zedillo (United Nations, 2001) estimated conservatively that
an additional US$50 billion would be re q u i red annually to achieve the
international development goals. The UN Millennium Project estimated that the
cost of the MDGs and other needs would involve additional ODA over 2003 levels
of $66 billion in 2006 and $83 billion in 2010 (see World Bank, 2005, page 162).
All such figures are estimates, and involve matters of judgement, but it seems
reasonable for present purposes to take these latter figures, based on detailed
needs assessments, as indicating the scale of necessary additional funding. I
should stress at this juncture that I am not discussing in this lecture the use of
ODA and its effectiveness. The use side of the account is a very important one,
but I am concentrating on the financing side. 
To these projected requirements there has already been an impressive response in
terms of ODA. At the Monterrey Conference in 2002, it was agreed by donor
countries to increase ODA very significantly. The G* meeting at Gleneagles agreed
to increase aid to Africa. A number of countries have made public commitments
to increase ODA, including the US Millennium Challenge Account. The OECD has
assembled these commitments in the projections shown in Figure 1. The graph
provides quite encouraging reading. After a decade of stagnation in the 1990s,
ODA has begun to rise noticeably since 2001, and the projected rise by 2006
would mean an additional $20 billion, increasing to $50 billion by 2010. 
All this suggests that the rich countries are responding to the challenge set by the
MDGs. There are, however, two reasons for caution. The first is that there remains
a sizeable shortfall from the costing of the UN Millennium Project. In 2010 the gap
would be some $30 billion in 2003 prices. This may be taken as indicating that
we need to increase ODA still further. As is argued by Reisen, “the most
straightforward way to avoid underfunding of the Goals is to raise ODA further”
(2004, page 1). And we should note that, even if the OECD projections for 2010
are met, the total will still be only 0.36% GNI (OECD, 2005), and 0.59% for the
European Union. But it is not clear that this is realistic.
The second reason for caution is indeed that even the projections are based on
intentions that may not be realised. This is well put by the OECD: “These figure s
a re impressive, but they do need to be treated with some caution. For many donors
they imply that aid will be perhaps the most rapidly rising element of public
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spending year after year. Given the pre s s u res on public budgets in many OECD
countries, delivering such increases will be a challenge” (OECD, 2005, page 1).
3. New Funding Proposals
For these reasons, I believe that we need to consider alternative sources of
funding, not least because time is of the essence. This was recognised by the UN
General Assembly, which in September 2000 asked for “a rigorous analysis of the
advantages, disadvantages and other implications of proposals for developing
new and innovative sources of funding”. This led to a project organised by WIDER
in Helsinki, for which I was responsible (Atkinson, 2004 and 2004a). 
In the project, we concentrated on seven of the many possibilities, as summarised
below:
(1) a global environmental tax, that is a tax on goods or services generating
environmental costs, with specific reference to a tax on hydro-carbon fuels
according to their carbon content, or indirectly via a tax on airline travel;
(2) a tax on currency flows (the ‘Tobin tax’), which is a tax on foreign currency
transactions, covering a range of transactions to be defined (spot, forward, swaps,
derivatives, etc);
Figure 1. Aid in Real Terms
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(3) creation by the IMF of new Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), with donor countries
making their allocation available to fund development;
(4) the International Finance Facility, proposed by the UK Government (HM
Treasury and Department for International Development, 2003), where there
would be a guarantee of long-term development aid, avoiding the uncertainties
described above, and allowing additional money to be leveraged from the
international capital markets;
(5) increased private donations for development, that is charitable donations by
small or large donors, the former being illustrated by UNICEF collections such as
Change for Good and the latter being illustrated by the Gates and Turner
Foundations; 
(6) a global lottery, operated through national operated and licensed lotteries, with
p roceeds shared between participating national lotteries and development
funding, a proposal being developed by former Finnish President, Martti Ahtisaari
(see Ahde, Pentikäinen and Seppänen, 2002); 
(7) increased remittances from emigrants, where steps are taken to facilitate and
reduce the cost of remittances. 
The measures clearly differ in scale. Private donations can only be expected to fill
a part of the funding gap, although the World Bank’s Global Monitoring Report
2005 draws attention to ‘the impressive scale of private contributions in response
to the recent Asian tsunami, and major private contributions to causes such as
combating HIV/AIDS’ (World Bank, 2005, page 13). It notes that grants from non-
governmental organisations totalled more than $10 billion in 2003. The other
proposals could raise more. It has been estimated that a Tobin Tax at 1 or 2 basis
points (that is 0.1 or 0.02 percent) could raise $15 or $28 billion. Taxes on carbon
use by rich countries could raise twice that amount. The IFF if introduced as
planned could achieve a flow of $50 billion for 2010-2015. 
There are other possibilities. It will be evident that the list just given is far from
exhaustive. In the case of global taxes, there are a number of other candidates: a
‘brain drain’ tax, taxation of ocean fishing, taxation of arms exports, a ‘bit tax’,
and a luxury goods tax. Each of these warrants examination. I am not suggesting
that the global taxes listed here are superior to those not covered. Rather I take
the Tobin tax and environmental taxes as examples of possible global taxes.
Similarly, it should be stressed that the measures are far from novel. At the same
time, our report did come up with one new idea. Tony Addison and Abdur
Chowdhury, in addition to investigating a global lottery, proposed a global ‘prize
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bond’. The return on both depends on a random prize draw, but, unlike a lottery,
the buyer of a prize bond does not lose the initial stake. It is only the interest that
goes into the draw. While financially equivalent, in that you could always invest in
a savings bank and buy lottery tickets with the interest, the global prize bond
could appeal to a different market and be regarded as more ethically acceptable.
4. Three Public Finance Questions
How can global public finance illuminate public debate about these alternative
ways of funding the MDGs? In considering these proposals, there are several
questions that occur naturally to the public finance economist. 
Tax/Spending versus Differential Incidence
The first question is perhaps obvious, but what exactly is being proposed? In
particular, there is sometimes confusion as to whether the new sources are
intended to be supplementary or in place of increased ODA. We need to
distinguish carefully two different comparisons.
The first is between the current position, labelled ‘Starting Point (O)’ in Figure 2,
and a situation, labelled ‘New Sources (A)’ in Figure 2, where there are new sources
to fund the MDGs. We are then comparing the economic costs of the tax with the
benefits from the MDG funding (this is the comparison labelled ‘tax/spending
incidence’ in Figure 2). To argue against the new sources, one would have to say
that the cost is too great, compared with the benefits from achieving the MDGs.
The second comparison is between new sources raising $X billion, labelled ‘New
Sources (A)’ in Figure 2 and increased ODA of the same amount, labelled point B
in Figure 2. We are then holding constant the contribution to development funding
and considering different methods of financing. (This is the comparison of A with
B labelled ‘differential incidence’ in Figure 2 .) It would be a legitimate argument
against the new sources to say that their cost is too great, compared with the cost
of raising the domestic taxes necessary to fund the increased ODA by donors.
The importance of clarity about the argument is illustrated by the case of the global
l o t t e ry. Opponents criticise this proposal on the grounds that the burden falls
p redominantly on poorer people in rich countries, whereas the cost of ODA financed
t h rough income taxation is borne by the better off. This distributional analysis
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relates to a diff e rential analysis of substituting a global lottery for increased ODA
(moving from B to A in F i g u re 2). In contrast, a global lottery as an addition to
existing funding may have quite diff e rent implications. The transfer from rich
countries may be distributionally pro g ressive in world terms, even when it is the
lower income groups who buy lottery tickets. We may think diff e rently about a
l o t t e ry that moves us from O to A than about one which moves us from B to A.
Who Pays?
In my example of the lottery, I have started considering the incidence, but with all
the proposals for new sources, one has to ask – who pays? There are good reasons
to expect that new global taxes will be passed on to final users. This applies to
energy taxes. People tend to think immediately of the impact of a carbon tax on
the fuel and transport costs of households, but energy costs enter also as inputs
in other sectors. The operating costs of the financial sector, for example, will be
increased, so that part may appear as higher prices for apparently unrelated
products. In the case of the Tobin tax, one has similarly to work through the input-
output consequences to determine the final incidence. Part of the burden may well
Figure 2. Net Addition to Development Resources or Alternative Source?
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fall on developing countries: for instance if the tax increases the cost of making
remittances from emigrants. The question of incidence is not limited to the two
tax proposals. Other measures have their costs. The increase in ODA that is
effectively envisaged under the International Finance Facility (IFF) has to be
financed, and the future commitments may affect the budgetary position of donor
countries. It is illusory to suppose that simply adopting an alternative funding
route avoids all cost.
Here I should note that our analysis of incidence can be no more firmly based than
the economic model on which it is based. Unfortunately, we have only limited
understanding of the economic impact of the different proposals. The final
incidence of a global tax, such as the carbon tax, depends on the responses of
firms and households that determine the ultimate general equilibrium. We can
only guess that the impact of a currency transactions tax will be larger in countries
more engaged in international trade. Views about the macro-economic impact of
SDR creation depend on how one believes that the world economy operates. We
know relatively little about the impact of remittances from migrant workers.
The one essential element is to take account of the full general equilibrium of the
economy. What, for example, is the possible effect of increased flows of resources
on the prices in different countries and on the terms of trade? Here international
trade theory is of great help. After the First World War, Keynes addressed this
problem in the context of reparations then being paid by Germany. In the present
context, will there be a switch of demand towards the products and services
produced by poor countries, and hence an improvement in their terms of trade?
This is not of merely footnote importance. According to Krugman and Obstfeld
(1994), the inflow of loans into the US in the early 1980s was a major contributor
to the temporary improvement in the US terms of trade. 
Is there a Double Dividend?
It is often argued that the proposals considered here have other advantages apart
from the revenue raised. This is the ‘double dividend’ argument. Indeed, the Tobin
tax was initially advocated as a means of reducing financial volatility (see Haq,
Kaul and Grunberg, 1996), and taxes on energy use have mainly been proposed
to slow down global warming. So we appear to have a bonus. At the same time as
funding development, we are helping to reduce global warming and to discourage
currency speculation. There is an allocational benefit. 
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However, in my view, this double dividend argument is over-stated, and it contains
certain seeds of contradiction. To begin with, the tax rates required to fund the
MDGs are an order of magnitude smaller than the tax rates proposed by those
advocating these taxes on allocational grounds. A major contribution to
development funding could be made with a Tobin tax at a rate of 1 or 2 basis
points (0.01 or 0.02 percent), whereas the Tobin taxes proposed to ‘put sand in
the wheels of international finance’ have been 10 or 20 basis points, or ten times
larger. The energy tax considered here has a rate per metric ton of a tenth or a
twentieth of those typically considered in the literature on global warming. The
taxes are not therefore guaranteed to have any major behavioural impact,
discouraging pollution and speculation. Indeed, there is something of a trade-off.
From the standpoint of raising revenue, we want to tax an activity that is relatively
unresponsive, so it is good news if the elasticity of demand is low; whereas if we
wish to discourage the activity, we hope that the elasticity is high. Taking this
argument to the limit, we may note that a carbon tax that reduced emissions to
zero would be an environmental success but a revenue failure!
There are also political considerations. It is often suggested that the double
dividend argument strengthens the case for certain global taxes. Tw o
justifications are better than one. This argument is related to the classic model of
‘logrolling’ where two politicians agree to support each other’s pet projects. One
is in favour of stopping global warming; the other is in favour of funding the
MDGs. However the logrolling model assumes a particular distribution of benefits
and losses from the projects, the former being concentrated and the latter diffuse.
Because the benefits are concentrated, it is easy to build coalitions. But in the case
of development funding and environmental protection, the reverse may be true:
the costs may be largely borne by a small interest group, and the benefits widely
dispersed. To be more concrete, opening up two fronts also invites attack from
both directions, particularly if, as we have seen, the two objectives require taxes
at very different levels. The double dividend case for the Tobin tax risks attracting
the hostility of opponents of the exchange stabilising level of taxation, who would
not necessarily oppose the much lower rate envisaged here.
The double dividend argument should not, in my view, be over-sold. The much
more modest tax rates envisaged here are more likely to be politically acceptable
and less likely to have disruptive economic consequences than the global taxes
proposed to curb speculation or to prevent environmental damage.
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5. Three Public Finance Insights
The role of public finance economists is in part to ask questions, as I have just
been doing, but it is also to provide new insights. If possible, one wants to be able
to unblock difficulties as well as create them. Here I suggest three constructive
insights.
We can make progress without unanimity
No doubt you have been thinking, as I have been speaking, about the problem of
getting agreement from all the major players. The natural instinct of many people
is to assume that there is an inherent free-rider problem and that there has to be
general, if not universal, agreement. In the present climate, with multilateralism
under question, this presumption provides grounds for pessimism about the
chances of making progress. Since any new issue has to be approved with an 85%
majority, the US alone can veto progress, and it has so far prevented the creation
by the IMF of Special Drawing Rights. In this case no action seems possible. 
But it does not follow that other measures are also blocked. With the other six
proposals, it would be possible, at least theoretically, for progress to be made
even without the agreement of all major countries. Here we can learn from the
internal experience of the European Union (EU). The EU has in the past faced
situations where one member state chose to ‘opt out’ of collective decisions. In
these circumstances, flexibility in the resulting institutions has allowed the
majority to respect the opting-out decision but still make progress towards the
majority objectives. There is ‘flexible geometry’. Partial adhesion has costs, but
the issue becomes one of balance, rather than an absolute block on action. 
We have to ask therefore in the case of each proposal whether we can in fact have
a ‘flexible geometry’, where it is viable to go ahead with a subset of countries? The
likely answer to this question varies from one proposal to another. The costs of
incomplete coverage depend on the nature of the source of funding. Failure of
countries to participate in the International Finance Facility means that the scale
of the operation is reduced, but the proposal is not undermined. The same applies
to the Global Lottery, or the Global Premium Bond; indeed insofar as these
schemes offer a new product, those not participating may lose out. With global
taxation, the free-riding problems become potentially more significant. Significant
opting out from a global carbon tax may erode the tax base, as producers relocate
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to non-participating countries, and expose participating countries to intense
lobbying from domestic interests. With a currency transactions tax, ease of
relocation of financial activity depends on how extensive is the taxing jurisdiction.
The larger the jurisdiction, the less elastic the response, and hence the greater the
revenue potential. It certainly seems realistic to explore how far the euro zone on
its own could introduce a Tobin tax at a modest rate, even if the homeland of its
inventor does not follow suit. It would have a cost in terms of competitiveness,
but this could be offset by an adjustment of the euro.
So the first insight is that we may be able to exploit variable geometry.
Subsidiarity can increase national acceptance 
A second lesson that we can learn from the EU concerns subsidiarity in the
administration of global taxation. A typical flow chart for national taxation is
shown in Figure 3. National governments determine the rates of taxation and the
tax base. Individual taxpayers pay the taxes to the government, which both
enforces payment and is in turn accountable to the electorate. Many taxes involve
intermediary agents. The individual taxpayer is shown in Figure 3, for example,
as paying the aircraft departure tax to the airline, which then accounts for the
revenue to the government. 
One evidently cannot apply exactly the same process to global taxation (Figure 4).
We have both global institutions and national governments, and it is the latter
Figure 3. Fiscal Architecture: National Taxation
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Figure 4. Fiscal Architecture in Global Setting
which have to agree to the taxes being levied and which are accountable to their
electorates. It could indeed be that the global tax is treated as simply a glorified
domestic tax, with the revenue being forwarded by national governments to a
global spending body (the heavy lines in F i g u re 4). But there are more
possibilities, as shown first by the dashed lines. If there were an international air
transport tax determined at the global level, then the airline could transfer the
money, not to the national government, but to a global tax authority, in which
case the new source of finance would bring a new actor into play. The dashed lines
in Figure 4 show this. Whether or not such a world tax authority (Tanzi, 1999) is
envisaged is one of the questions that have to be considered.
Moving in the opposite direction from the introduction of a world tax authority is
the case shown by dotted lines in Figure 4, where national governments retain not
only control over the administration of the tax process but also discretion over the
tax rates. In this case, participating governments would agree on their national tax
liability but retain freedom to decide how the revenue is to be raised. This would
in effect be applying the principle of subsidiarity adopted by the European Union. 
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To see why these may make the global tax more acceptable, let us take a concrete
illustration. Suppose that the participating governments agree that each country
should pay a tax related to national carbon emissions. This determines the
amount that each participating country has to pay, but the national government
would remain free to raise the revenue in whatever manner it thought fit. The
national government might consider, for example, that a tax on air journeys was
unfair on those living in remote rural areas, and choose for domestic reasons a
different tax base. We would then have a two-tier structure, with the national tax
obligation requirement being agreed multilaterally, but the tax implementation
being chosen locally. Countries with more emissions would pay more total tax, but
this would not necessarily mean higher fuel taxes. Income tax or a broad-based
VAT could be raised instead. One reason why, under the subsidiarity architecture,
a national government may choose a different tax base is that it faces political
opposition to a particular form of taxation. The fuel tax protests of 2000 in Europe
provide a good illustration. (Of course, this would eliminate any double dividend
at the individual level.)
Changing Distribution of Income
Returning finally to ODA, the public finance economist naturally thinks of ODA as
a kind of income tax paid by rich countries, with, if the UN target were to be met,
countries paying 0.7% of their income if they pass a certain level of per capita
income. It is not a flat tax: there is in effect a ‘notch’ with the tax jumping from
zero as a country passes some critical level. Of course, it is not a compulsory
payment, but it raises some of the same issues. In particular, we need to consider
more carefully the definition of the ‘critical level’ at which countries become
expected to contribute, and the rate structure. 
A formalisation of the criteria for aid giving seems timely in view of the current
changes in the world distribution of income, with the emergence of middle income
countries with the potential to contribute additional resources to the funding of
development. In order to take this explicitly into account, I suggest that we
consider setting the critical level at a fixed level in terms of purchasing power. The
present members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee, who account
for some 95% of ODA, include members with per capita PPP adjusted incomes
down to $19,250 in 2004 (Portugal). A number of countries with lower incomes
per head, such as the Czech Republic and Saudi Arabia, make substantial ODA
payments, so that a lower figure may be appropriate. Suppose, for example, that
Jelle Zijlstra Lecture  4  12-12-2005  10:29  Pagina 16
17Global Public Finance and Funding the Millennium Development Goals
we were to set the critical level at $40 a day or $14,600 a year? This would bring
in countries such as Israel, Slovenia, Korea, and Hungary. Alternatively, we could
adopt a stepped structure, where countries with incomes per head in excess of
$25 a day, say, would be set a target of 0.3%, and those above $50 a day, the 0.7
target. This would bring in countries such as Poland, Argentina, South Africa, Chile
and Mexico, and, importantly, would mean that there would be growing numbers
of donors among the rapidly growing middle-income countries.
So far I have discussed the issue in terms of the per capita incomes of countries,
but we need also to consider the distribution of income within countries, as has
been noted in the literature on international burden-sharing (Kravis and
Davenport, 1963). Suppose that we regard as ‘taxable’ only income in excess of
the critical level $25 a day, with the progressive aid contribution calculated as a
percentage of all incomes in excess of this amount. The contribution of a country
would then depend on its distribution of income: countries with higher
proportions below the critical level (or, more accurately, larger income deficits)
would find their contribution increased. A country with no one below the critical
level would have its per capita ‘tax base’ reduced by the full amount; if, on the
other hand, some people fall $X below, with this money going to people above the
poverty line, then the tax base is increased by this amount. (In the limit if all
income goes to one person, then essentially all national income is in the tax base.)
So that, if there is increasing income inequality in OECD countries, this would
increase their taxable capacity.
Conclusions: Grounds for Optimism?
In this lecture I have taken it for granted that rich countries are serious about their
commitment to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. I have taken it for
granted that additional re s o u rces can be employed effectively to raise perm a n e n t l y
the living standards of poor countries and their poorest citizens. On this basis, I
have examined some of the ways in which these re s o u rces could be funded. 
The direction taken at this juncture will depend largely on political events and
political decisions, but I believe that there are some grounds for optimism that
progress can be made. As we have seen, there has in the new millennium been a
clear upturn in Official Development Assistance, after stagnation in the 1990s. But
there remains a funding gap, and the promises have yet to be fulfilled. 
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At the same time, there are alternatives. One of the proposals considered here, the
IFF, is designed to make a reality of the ODA commitments; others could
contribute significant additional amounts. Progress, if slow, is beginning to be
made at a political level. After completing our WIDER report, I was asked to join a
Technical Group established by President Chirac, which prepared a report under
the chairmanship of Jean-Pierre Landau (2004). The report was presented at the
first global interg o v e rnmental conference to discuss innovative means of
financing development on 20 September 2004, convened by President Lula da
Silva of Brazil, co-sponsored by President Chirac and President Lagos of Chile, and
Prime Minister Zapatero of Spain. Some fifty Heads of State and Government
attended the meeting. One hundred and thirteen countries signed a declaration
that further consideration be given to the proposals, and headway is being made
with a solidarity contribution added to the cost of airline tickets.
All such proposals raise questions, and one of the functions of the new subject of
global public finance is to ask such questions – such as who pays? For this, we
need to develop the appropriate economic analysis, and much remains to be done.
But we can already provide new insights:
• That the case for global taxation should be made on its own merits, and not 
rely on appeals to a double dividend (the two sets of objectives are not the 
same).
• That we can learn from EU experience when there is not unanimity; flexible 
geometry may allow a sub-group of countries to proceed even in the face of 
opposition from other rich countries.
• Subsidiarity, also an EU invention, can increase the likely acceptability of the 
proposals; we can separate the taxation of countries from the taxation of 
citizens.
• The changing world distribution of income points to the need to formalise 
expectations regarding aid donorship.
The issues that I have been discussing understandably arouse strong feelings, but
I hope that I have demonstrated that sober economic analysis has an important
role to play.
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Goal 1
Eradicate extreme poverty • Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people 
and hunger whose income is less than US $1 a day.
• Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people 
who suffer from hunger.
Goal 2
Achieve universal primary education • Ensure that by 2015 all children will be able to complete a 
full course of primary schooling.
Goal 3
Promote gender equality • Eliminate gender disparity in all levels of education by 
and empower women 2015.
Goal 4
Reduce child mortality • Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the 
under-5 mortality rate.
Goal 5
Improve maternal health • Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the 
maternal mortality ratio.
Goal 6
Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria • Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of 
and other diseases HIV/AIDS.
• Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of 
malaria and other major diseases.
Goal 7
Ensure environmental sustainability • Integrate principles of sustainable development into 
country policies and reverse the loss of environmental 
resources.
• Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without 
sustainable access to safe drinking water.
• Have achieved, by 2020, a significant improvement in the 
lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers.
Goal 8
Develop a global partnership for • Develop the world trading and financial system.
development • Address the special needs of the least developed and 
landlocked and small island countries.
• Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of 
developing countries.
Box 1. Summary of Millennium Development Goals
19Global Public Finance and Funding the Millennium Development Goals
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